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Previous tests of e±cient risk sharing have assumed that households have identical risk
preferences. This assumption is equivalent to the restriction that households can pool their
resources, but cannot optimally allocate them according to individual risk preferences. In this
paper, we ¯rst test the hypothesis of homogeneous risk preferences and reject it. This result
implies that previous tests should have rejected e±ciency even if households are perfectly sharing
risk. We then derive two tests of e±cient risk sharing that allow for heterogeneity in risk
preferences. Using the two tests we cannot reject e±cient risk sharing.
1 Introduction
E±cient risk sharing has been tested in several papers and it is generally rejected. Cochrane
(1991), Mace (1991), Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotliko® (1992), Townsend (1994), Hayashi, Altonji,
and Kotliko® (1996), Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997), and Ogaki and Zhang (2001) are the main
examples. These papers have two features in common. First, e±cient risk sharing is tested using
only variation in consumption expenditure. Second, it is assumed that households have identical
preferences for risk.
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1The assumption of homogeneous risk preferences imposes strong restrictions on the risk sharing
test. To see this it is helpful to divide intra-household risk sharing into two parts. First, households
pool their resources and consequently eliminate the idiosyncratic uncertainty that they are facing.
We will refer to this component of risk sharing as income pooling. Second, households insure each
other by allocating pooled income according to individual risk preferences. This component of risk
sharing will be denoted by the term mutual insurance. A priori the mutual insurance component
of risk sharing is at least as important as income pooling. The assumption of homogeneous risk
preferences, however, is equivalent to the assumption that the optimal allocation of pooled resources
is an insigni¯cant fraction of risk sharing. If in the data this is not the case, a test of e±ciency
based on homogeneous risk preferences will reject e±ciency even if households fully share risk.
This paper makes two main contributions. First, under e±ciency we test if risk preferences
are homogeneous across households and we reject this hypothesis. Second, we derive two tests of
e±cient risk sharing that allow for heterogeneous risk preferences. Using variation in consumption
expenditure, we cannot reject e±cient risk sharing.
The test of homogeneity in risk preferences is based on the following idea. Consider an economy
characterized by e±cient risk sharing with only two households. If risk preferences are heteroge-
neous, the mutual insurance component of risk sharing must be a feature of household behavior.
Mutual insurance implies that for some realizations of pooled income household 1's consumption
will be larger than household 2's, whereas for other realizations household 2 will consume more. As
a consequence, household 1's consumption as a function of aggregate resources will cross the con-
sumption function of household 2. Thus, under e±ciency if the consumption functions of households
1 and 2 cross, the hypothesis of homogeneous risk preferences is rejected. Using the International
Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) data on non-durable consumption,
leisure, and wages we ¯nd strong evidence against the hypothesis that households have identi-
cal preferences for risk. This result has two implications. First, previous papers that have used
ICRISAT should have rejected e±ciency even if households share risk e±ciently. Second, any test
of e±ciency should allow for heterogeneity in risk preferences.
The two tests of e±ciency that we propose are based on the following result. We show that
if households share risk e±ciently, their consumption must be an increasing function of pooled
resources. We also show that this restriction is the only testable implication of e±cient risk sharing
if (i) the only assumptions on the household utility functions are non-satiation and concavity and
2(ii) only longitudinal variation in consumption is observed. Any other testable implication is the
result of additional assumptions on household preferences. This result contains two testable impli-
cations. First, household consumption should increase with pooled resources. Second, household
consumption should be a function of pooled income in the sense that for any realization of pooled
resources one should never observe two di®erent levels of household consumption. This implies that
after controlling for pooled resources, household consumption should not dependent on variables
that capture idiosyncratic shocks. We test both implications by allowing for heterogeneous risk
preferences.
This paper is one of the ¯rst attempts to test e±cient risk sharing using the restriction that
household consumption should increase with pooled resources. The main advantage of this test is
that it does not require the choice of alternative variables, which is sometimes arbitrary and a®ected
by endogeneity in case of nonseparability between consumption and leisure. This implication of
e±ciency is ¯rst tested under the assumption that consumption and leisure are separable. We
reject e±cient risk sharing in 8 out of 1122 possible cases. We then test the restriction allowing
for non-separability between consumption and leisure. In this case we reject the hypothesis that
households share risk e±ciently in only one case.
The second implication tested in this paper is the standard restriction tested in the e±ciency
literature. Our test, however, di®ers from previous ones in two respects. First, households can have
di®erent preferences for risk. Second, we use a semi-parametric approach to estimate consumption
as a function of pooled resources and other variables. Consequently the choice of the functional
form for the consumption functions has smaller e®ects on the outcome of the tests. The test
is implemented using non-labor income as an additional variable ¯rst under the assumption of
separability between consumption and leisure and then without this assumption. In both cases we
cannot reject the hypothesis that non-labor income does not a®ect household expenditure. This
indicates that if risk preferences are allowed to vary across households, there is little or no evidence
against e±cient risk sharing.1
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we discuss the tests proposed in previous papers.
In section 3, we present a model of e±cient risk sharing. In section 4, we derive the testable
1Schulhofer-Wohl (2006) also tests e±cient risk sharing allowing for heterogeneity in risk preferences. The paper
di®ers in several respects from ours. First, there is no test of heterogeneity in risk preferences. Second, the author
uses only the test previously used in the risk sharing literature. Third, the standard risk sharing test is implemented
using the PSID.
3implications of homogeneity in risk preferences and e±ciency. In section 5, the data used in the
tests are described. In section 6, we discuss the semi-parametric estimation of the household
expenditure function and its derivatives. Section 7 presents the results under the assumption that
preferences are separable between consumption and leisure. Section 8 reports the results with
non-separable preferences. Section 9 concludes.
2 Tests of E±cient Risk Sharing in the Literature
In this section we discuss the tests of e±ciency used in the risk sharing literature. Consider an
economy in which the households have di®erent preferences, are endowed with risky incomes, and
can share risk e±ciently among them. The allocation of risk in this economy can be divided into its
income pooling and mutual insurance components. Several papers have tested whether households
share risk e±ciently in this type of economy. The main examples are Cochrane (1991), Mace (1991),
Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotliko® (1992), Townsend (1994), Hayashi, Altonji, and Kotliko® (1996),
Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997), and Ogaki and Zhang (2001). The tests used in those papers are
valid tests of e±cient risk sharing only if mutual insurance is an insigni¯cant part of risk sharing.
To see this consider the following simple example. The example and the related discussion is
not meant to diminish the importance of the papers mentioned above. Those paper had and are
still having a signi¯cant in°uence in economics that goes beyond the e±ciency test. The discussion
is meant to point out a crucial de¯ciency in the proposed tests. The economy is composed of
two households living for T periods in an environment with uncertainty. As it is standard in
this literature, it is assumed that preferences are separable over time, across states of nature, and
between consumption and leisure.2 Each household is characterized by preferences that belong to
the Harmonic Absolute Risk Aversion (HARA) class, i.e. ui
c (c) = (ai + c)
¡°i. The HARA class
includes the most commonly used utility functions, namely the Constant Absolute Risk Aversion
(CARA) and the Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility functions.
A necessary and su±cient condition for e±cient risk sharing is that the ratio of marginal utilities
is constant across states of nature and over time and equal to the ratio of Pareto weights. This
2Hayashi, Altonji, and Kotliko® (1996) use preferences that are nonseparable in consumption and leisure. The
intuition provided in this section applies also to those papers. However, a model with nonseparable preferences allows
for more general patters of household consumption. We consider this more general case in the next sections.
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with Yt;! equal to pooled resources in period t and state !.
Figure 1 depicts the e±ciency condition (1) for di®erent realization of Yt;! and for the following
set of preference parameters: a1 = 1, a2 = 2, °1 = 2:5, °2 = 1:25, ¹1 = ¹2. This ¯gure can be used
to describe the e±cient allocation of risk between household 1 and 2. In the example considered
here, ¹1u1
c and ¹2u2
c cross once. It can be shown that under the assumption of HARA preferences
these two functions can cross zero, one, or two times. We analyze the one-crossing case because it
also provides the insight for the zero-crossing and the two-crossings case. Figure 1 is characterized
by two regions. The region on the left of the crossing corresponds to adverse realizations of pooled
resources. Here the less risk averse household consumes less than half of pooled resources. This
allocation of aggregate income can be interpreted as the outcome of the insurance provided by the
less risk averse household against adverse realizations. The second region is characterized by good
realizations. Here the less risk averse household consumes more than half of pooled resources as
a compensation for the insurance provided. The main implication of all this is that the less risk
averse household has more volatile consumption paths.
Consider now the same economy except that the two households have identical HARA prefer-
ences. This example encompasses the cases considered by Cochrane (1991), Mace (1991), Altonji,
Hayashi, and Kotliko® (1992), Townsend (1994), Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997), and Ogaki and
Zhang (2001).3 Figure 2 depicts the corresponding e±ciency condition under the assumption that
3Townsend (1994) reports two sets of results. One set is obtained using the panel of households interviewed by
the International Crops Research Institute of the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT). In this case, it is assumed that all
households have identical CARA preferences. The second set of results is obtained by regressing changes in individual
consumption on changes in aggregate resources and individual income for each household separately using six or ten
observations at a time. In this case, households are characterized by heterogeneous CARA preferences. Note that
CARA utility functions are obtained as the limit of a HARA utility function as the curvature parameter ° tends to
in¯nity. Consequently, heterogeneous CARA preferences allow for di®erent subsistence levels ai, but the curvature
parameter cannot di®er across households. Using this result it can be shown that this class of preferences does
not allow for the mutual insurance component of risk sharing. However it is true that with heterogeneous CARA
5the two households have identical Pareto weights. In this case, the two households consumes half
of pooled resources for each realization of Yt;!. Figure 3 describes the same economy except that
¹1 > ¹2. In this case the household with higher Pareto weight always receives a larger fraction of
aggregate resources. The assumption of identical preferences is therefore equivalent to assuming
that in the economy there is no mutual insurance.
To understand the e®ect of ignoring mutual insurance on the tests used in previous papers,
we consider a generalization of the test employed in Mace (1991). The generalization allows for
any utility function that belongs to the HARA class as long as households have identical prefer-
ences. Consequently, it includes as special cases the tests used in Cochrane (1991), Mace (1991),
Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotliko® (1992), Townsend (1994), Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997), and
Ogaki and Zhang (2001). To simplify the discussion, it is assumed that the there is no observable































where f (c) = c for CARA preferences, f (c) = log(c) for CRRA preferences, and f (c) = log(a + c)
for HARA preferences and J is the number of households in the economy. According to this
equation, under e±ciency the ¯rst di®erence of transformed household consumption should be equal
to the ¯rst di®erence of aggregate transformed consumption. This implies that the ¯rst di®erence
of household i's transformed consumption must equal the ¯rst di®erence for every other household
in the economy. For instance, for CRRA preferences the consumption growth of household i should
equal consumption growth of every other household in each period t and state !.
Now consider an economy in which households have the heterogenous HARA preferences used
in ¯gure 1. Suppose that in period t the economy is characterized by an adverse realization of
aggregate resources. According to ¯gure 1, in this period the economy is characterized by c2
t < c1
t.











































which contradicts the test used in Mace (1991) and in the other papers.5
preferences the weighted marginal utilities may cross if there is heterogeneity in Pareto weights. But this is only a
consequence of di®erent Pareto weights and not of heterogeneity in risk preferences.
4The dependence on the state of nature is suppressed for ease of exposition.
5Note that the test proposed by Cochrane (1991) has the same problem. The assumption of identical CRRA
6To summarize the assumption of identical preferences is equivalent to the assumption that
there is no mutual insurance component of risk sharing, and that one should only focus on income
pooling. If in the economies studied in the risk sharing literature risk preferences are heterogeneous
and mutual insurance is a signi¯cant part of risk sharing, previous papers should have rejected
e±ciency even if household behavior is fully e±cient.
The previous discussion suggests that e±cient risk sharing may have been rejected in the past
because mutual insurance was not considered. Observe, however, that in previous papers e±cient
risk sharing was rejected by testing whether changes in individual consumption are explained by
changes in individual income even after controlling for changes in aggregate consumption. In the
risk sharing literature the coe±cient on income is generally statistically signi¯cant and positive.6
Can the failure to consider mutual insurance explain this result? The answer to this question is
positive if households with lower risk aversion have more volatile income processes.7
To see this note that with heterogeneous preferences household consumption is a household-
speci¯c function of aggregate resources. Under HARA preferences the di®erences in utility func-
tions can be summarized by the heterogeneity in curvature parameter °i and subsistence level ai.











where fi (c) is the function introduced earlier in this section. A ¯rst order Taylor expansion around




















































(8) in Cochrane (1991). If preferences are heterogeneous these terms become household speci¯c and they are equivalent
to a household ¯xed e®ect in a panel estimation. Since the main idea in Cochrane (1991) is to use cross-sectional
data instead of panel data, it is not possible to control for the household ¯xed e®ect. Consequently, Cochrane's and
Mace's tests are a®ected by the same problem.
6Ogaki and Zhang (2001) ¯nd that the coe±cient is positive and signi¯cantly di®erent from zero in the ICRISAT
for Aurepalle when they allow for a subsistence level and for Shirapur when they set the subsistence level to zero.
7Barsky et al. (1997) ¯nd that less risk averse people are more likely to be self-employed.





function of °i. Hence, the second term on the right hand side of (2) is positive for the less risk
averse households and negative for the more risk averse households. The e±ciency test is generally










= ® + »¢yi
t+1 + ²i
t+1:
for some functions fi (:) and g (:). If the economy is composed of households with heterogeneous
curvature parameters °i that share risk e±ciently, the error term ²i
t+1 has the following form:
²i
t+1 = ¡»¢yi


















= 0. Using the equation de¯ning the error term, the OLS estimate of the




































































which implies that the coe±cient on individual income will be on average positive as it was found
in previous papers.
Theoretically the failure of considering heterogeneous risk preferences and mutual insurance
can explain the rejection of e±ciency. Are heterogeneous risk preferences and mutual insurance
important features of risk sharing in the data? The rest of the paper is devoted to answering this
question by developing tests that allow for risk preferences that vary across households.
3 A Model of E±cient Risk Sharing
In this section we describe the model of e±cient risk sharing that will be used to derive the tests.
Consider an economy in which households live for ¿ periods. In each period t, let !t denote the
8realization of all variables in the economy. For a given history of realizations ht = (!1;:::;!t),
in period t household i is endowed with a wage wi
t (ht) and a total amount of time Ti
t (ht) that
can be divided between leisure and labor. The aggregate amount of non-labor resources in the
economy is denoted by Yt (ht), where Yt (ht) may include pro¯ts and saving. Let ci
t (ht) and li
t (ht)
be, respectively, consumption and leisure of household i in period t conditional on the history ht.
Household preferences are assumed to be separable over time and across states of nature. They
are allowed to depend on observable and unobservable heterogeneity, which will be denoted by
zi
t (ht) and ´i








to be strictly increasing, strictly concave, and twice continuously di®erentiable in consumption and
leisure. Households are characterized by a common discount factor ¯ and share the same beliefs
over histories of realizations, which are denoted by P (ht).
E±cient risk sharing in this economy can be described using a standard Pareto problem. Let
¹i be the Pareto weight assigned to household i with
Pn
i ¹i = 1 and suppose for simplicity that


































t (ht) for each t, ht;
ci
t (ht) > 0; 0 · li
t (ht) · Ti
t (ht) for each t, ht;
where the right hand side of the resource constraint is full income in the economy.8
The solution of the Pareto problem (3) can be characterized using three stages. The decom-
position of the problem in stages will be helpful in dealing with observable and unobservable
heterogeneity in the tests. In the last stage, let ½i
t (ht) be an arbitrary amount of aggregate re-
sources allocated to household i. Then in each period t and for each history ht, household i choose





















t (ht) + wi
t (ht)li
t (ht) = ½i
t (ht)
ci
t (ht) ¸ 0; 0 · li
t (ht) · Ti
t (ht):
8We model Pareto e±ciency using full income because in small economies, for instance in villages, wages are
imposed from the outside and are not the outcome of an equilibrium in the economy.
9In the second stage, let ½
i;j
t (ht) denote the amount of aggregate resources allocated to household



















































Observe that the solution of this problem is only a function of wages and heterogeneity of households


















for k = i;j:
This result and this stage are important for the derivation of the tests because, after accounting for
½
i;j
t , they will enable us to control for the wages and heterogeneity variables of only two households.
Without this stage one would have to control for the wages and heterogeneity variables of all the
households in the economy.
In the ¯rst stage, aggregate resources available in period t conditional on the history ht are







































where wt, zt, and ´t are the vectors of wages and heterogeneity variables.
Under the standard assumptions that preferences are separable over time, across states of
nature, and that consumption and leisure of household i are separable from consumption and
9Unless required for expositional clarity, the dependence on the history of realizations will be suppressed in the
rest of the paper.
10The Pareto problem can be decomposed in three stages by pairing households in di®erent ways. Here we consider
one possible set of pairs under the assumption that there is an even number of households in the economy. If n is
odd, three households will have to be arranged in one group.















































t (ht) for each t, ht;
ci
t (ht) ¸ 0; 0 · li
t (ht) · Ti
t (ht) for each t, ht;
i.e. the solution of the three-stage problem is equivalent to the original Pareto problem. To
provide the intuition underlying this result note that under the assumptions made in this paper,
the conditions of the second welfare theorem are ful¯lled. As a result the solution of the Pareto
problem can be decentralized using transfers.
4 Testable Implications
In this section we derive testable implications of homogeneity in risk preferences and e±cient risk-
sharing using the second stage of the e±ciency problem described in the previous section. The
discussion will be divided into two parts. In the ¯rst part we will consider an economy where
households share risk e±ciently and we will derive a restriction that will enable us to test whether
risk preferences are homogeneous across households. In the second part of this section we will
consider two possible environments. In the ¯rst environment, household preferences are separable
between consumption and leisure. In the second environment, household preferences are non-
separable but for each household there is no variation in real wages across states of nature and over
time. We will ¯nd necessary and su±cient conditions for e±cient risk sharing and show that they
are identical in these two environments. To simplify the discussion, we will assume throughout the
section that there is no observable or unobservable heterogeneity.
Consider an economy where households share risk e±ciently. The testable restriction of homo-
geneity in risk preferences is based on the following idea. Suppose that household i and j fully
insure each other. As discussed in section 2, if for some realizations of total income household i
receives a larger amount of pooled resources and for other realizations household j receives a larger
amount, their marginal utilities must cross. If their marginal utilities cross their risk preferences
cannot be identical. Consequently, under e±ciency if in one period ½i > ½j and in a di®erent period
11½i < ½j, the two households cannot have identical preferences for risk. This idea is formalized in
the following propositions.
Proposition 1 Suppose that household i and j share risk e±ciently. If there exist two realizations











household i and household j cannot have identical risk preferences.
Proof. In the appendix.
We will now derive testable implications of e±cient risk sharing. Consider an economy where
either household preferences are separable between consumption and leisure or real wages can vary
across households but for each household they are constant for each ! and for each t. This is the
case considered in previous papers that have tested e±cient risk sharing. Mace (1991), Townsend
(1994), Altonji et al. (1992), Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997), and Ogaki and Zhang (2001) assume
separability between consumption and leisure. Cochrane (1991) uses a cross-section of households
and hence ignores any longitudinal variation in real wages. Hayashi et al. (1996) exploit longitudinal
consumption variation after controlling for longitudinal variation in leisure. This is equivalent to
using longitudinal variation in consumption after having removed the portion that is explained by
longitudinal variation in real wages.
To derive testable implications in this economy, consider households i and j and observe that
under e±ciency the following two restrictions must be ful¯lled. First, after controlling for di®erences
in real wages across households, only pooled income should a®ect the amount of resources received




. Second, an increase in pooled income should increase the amount of resources
allocated to household i as well as to household j. If one of these restrictions is not satis¯ed,
household behavior is not only a®ected by changes in pooled income as predicted by e±cient risk
sharing, but also by idiosyncratic shocks. These two restrictions imply that a necessary condition for




are strictly increasing functions of
aggregate income. It turns out that without assuming a particular function form for the increasing





are strictly increasing functions of ½i;j, then it is always possible
to ¯nd increasing and concave household utility functions and Pareto weights such that e±ciency
is satis¯ed. All this implies that if only variation in expenditure is observed, the only testable
implication of e±cient risk sharing is that the amount of resources allocated to each household
are an increasing function of total income. Any other restriction is the outcome of the particular
function form selected for household preferences. The following proposition summarizes this result.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the utility functions of household i and j are strictly increasing and





strictly increasing functions of pooled income.
Suppose in addition that preferences are separable between consumption and leisure or wi and




are strictly increasing functions of
pooled income, there exist utility functions that are strictly increasing and concave such that the
two households share risk e±ciently.
Proof. In the appendix.
In the remaining sections the results presented here will be used to evaluate whether households
in Indian villages share risk e±ciently.
5 Estimation of the Expenditure Functions
The tests proposed in this paper require a separate estimate of the expenditure function ½k ¡
½i;j;wi;wj;zi;zj;´i;´j¢
for each household. With heterogeneous risk preferences, there is no close form solution for the
household expenditure function. This implies that a parametric approach would have to rely on
approximations of this function.11 To avoid this problem, a semi-parametric approach is used in the
estimation. In the rest of the paper we will use the term observable and unobservable heterogeneity
to refer to di®erences in z and ´ across households, and we will use the term heterogeneity in risk
preferences to refer to di®erences across household utility functions.
The semi-parametric estimator of the expenditure functions used here requires four assump-
tions. First, we will assume that observable and unobservable heterogeneity enter the expenditure
11A close form solution exists for heterogeneous CARA preferences. However, all CARA preferences have identical
curvature parameters and therefore no heterogeneity in the only feature of risk preferences that is crucial for the
insurance component of risk sharing.




+´i¡´j a®ects ½k. This assumption simpli¯es signi¯cantly the estimation since
all the variation in heterogeneity is captured by the single index di;j. Second, it is assumed that
the unobservable component of heterogeneity does not change over time. Under this assumption,
the e®ect of ´i ¡ ´j can be captured by adding a constant to the vector of observables z.12 As a
third assumption, to reduce the variance of the estimates we will impose the restriction that the
coe±cients on the observable heterogeneity terms are common across households. Lastly, in the
estimation we allow for measurement errors m that are additive in individual expenditure. Under
























+´i¡´j. Since total expenditure ½
i;j
t is the sum of individual expenditures,
½
i;j
t depends on the error term mk. In the estimation we will consider this dependence using an
estimator that allows for endogenous variables. But we will assume that mk is independent of
wages and heterogeneity variables.
There is a large class of preferences that generates the expenditure function (6). For instance,










The expenditure functions are estimated as follows. Suppose that the parameters µ on the
heterogeneity variables are known. The function gk can then be estimated using standard nonpara-
















we use the nonparametric approach developed by Newey, Powell, and Vella (1999). We will brie°y
describe the method.
















For a linear function h, the moment conditions are equivalent to the assumption that q is orthogonal
12It is straightforward to modify the estimator used in this paper to allow ´
i ¡ ´
j to vary over time. In this case
we can follow Blundell and Powell (2001) and consider the expectation of the expenditure function over ´
i ¡´
j. This
approach, however, requires a larger panel than the one that is available to us.
13The time subscript will be suppressed in the remaining sections to simplify the notation.



























. Newey et al. (1999) propose to estimate the function gk in two steps. In
the ¯rst step the error term u is estimated nonparametrically as ^ ui;j = ½i;j ¡^ h
¡
qi;j¢
. In the second
step, the additive regression






is estimated using the estimated residuals ^ u in place of the true ones. An estimator of the function
gk can then be recover by isolating the components that do not depend on the residuals u. In
this paper, all the nonparametric estimations are performs using the series estimator suggested by
Newey et al. (1999) with polynomials.
The parameters on the heterogeneity variables are not known, but they can be estimated using
one of the semi-parametric methods developed for the estimation of single-index models. In this
paper we use the semi-parametric least square approach proposed by Ichimura (1993).
6 The Tests
The next three subsections describe the approach used to test homogeneity in risk preferences and
e±ciency.
6.1 Test of Homogeneous Risk Preferences
The test of homogeneity in risk preferences is based on the result that under e±ciency and identical
risk preferences the expenditure functions should not cross. We are unaware of any test in the
econometric or statistical literature that enables one to test whether two functions cross. For this
reason we construct a new test which is based on the following idea.
Consider the di®erence between household i's and household j's expenditure functions:




+ mi;j = gi;j ¡
½i;j;wi;wj;di;j¢
+ mi;j:
For any given realization of wi, wj, di;j, under identical risk preferences gi;j as a function of
½i;j should be either always positive or always negative. This implies that under the null the
15maximum of gi;j ¡
½i;j¢







is negative the null is rejected and the two households must have heteroge-
neous preferences.
The test is constructed in two steps using the previous idea. We ¯rst estimate the function
gi;j using the method described in the previous section and the corresponding variance using the
estimator proposed by Newey et al. (1999). Denote by ^ gi;j and V AR
¡
^ gi;j¢















where we divide by the standard error so that ^ gi;j has the same variance for each ½i;j. The test
statistic is then de¯ned as


















is the standard error of ^ »1 and q¤ (0:05) is the 5-th percentile of the empirical distri-
bution.
Two remarks should be discussed. First, we divide ^ gi;j by its standard error to increase the
power of the test. To understand why this transformation increases the power of the test, suppose







3 , and ½
i;j






































3 is so large that the function at these two points




4 is small enough that ^ gi;j
is statistically positive in the ¯rst case and negative in the second case. Then the test would not
reject the null even if the alternative is correct. By dividing by the standard error we avoid this
problem because ¹ gi;j has the same variance at each point.
16As a second remark, note that the 5-th percentile can be computed using di®erent methods. Hall
(1992) and Horowitz (2002) argue that the percentile-t bootstrap method have better theoretical
properties than the standard percentile method. For this reason we follow Hall (1992) and Horowitz
(2002) and compute q¤ (0:05) as follows. For each bootstrap we compute the bootstrap t-statistics
^ »¤












are computed using the bootstrap sample and ^ »¤
1 using the original sample.
The 5-th percentile is then calculated using the bootstrap t-statistics.
6.2 Test of E±ciency with Excluded Variables
The ¯rst test of e±ciency that we perform is the standard test of excluded variables: after control-
ling for total expenditure, wages, and heterogeneity, any variable that captures household speci¯c
shocks should not enter the expenditure function. The main di®erence between the test used here
and previous tests is that we employ a semi-parametric approach to allow for di®erences in risk
preferences.
The semi-parametric approach is based on the test proposed by Fan and Li (1996). Suppose
that the expenditure function of household i depends on an excluded variable yi. Then the function
can be written in the following form:





+ ²i = fi ¡
Xi;j;yi¢
+ ²i;
where Xi;j contains ½i;j, wi, wj, di;j, and ui;j, and E
£
²ijXi;j;yi¤
= 0. Under the null hypoth-

























= 0 under the null and E
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uijXi;j;yi¤











¸ 0, where the equality holds if and only if the null

























where f (:) denotes the probability density function.
17In this paper we estimate the residuals using the series estimator described in section 5. The
densities and the conditional expectation are estimated using a standard kernel estimator. The
distribution of the test statistic ^ »2 is obtained using bootstrap. The null hypothesis is then rejected





´ > q¤ (0:95);
where q¤ (0:95) is the 95-th percentile obtained using the percentile-t bootstrap method. The test
will be performed using non-labor income as the excluded variable.
6.3 Test of E±ciency with Increasing Expenditure Functions
The second test of e±ciency evaluates whether the household expenditure function is increasing
in total resources and rejects e±cient risk sharing if part of the function decreases with ½i;j. The
test that we use in this paper is a generalization of the monotonicity test introduced by Hall and
Heckman (2000) to a model with multiple regressors and endogeneity.
The intuition underlying the test can be described a follows. Consider household i's expenditure
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and estimate the slope of a linear regression of ½i on ½i;j. Repeat the
last step for any subset of the sorted data that contains enough information to estimate the slope.




minimum over all the estimated slopes should not be negative.
Formally the test statistic is de¯ned as follows. For a given integer m that will be de¯ned later,






















For each choice of r and s, let ^ a(r;s), ^ b(r;s), ^ h(r;s), and ^ ¸(r;s) be the solution of the following
18least square problem:
³
^ a;^ b;^ h; ^ ¸
´
= argmin S (a;b;h;¸jr;s):
The integer m must therefore be larger than the sum of the order of the polynomials plus 2. The
variance matrix of the estimated coe±cients is equal to ¾2 (X0X)
¡1, where ¾2 is the variance of







is equal to ¾2 where (X0X)
¡1
b;b is the diagonal element of the inverse
matrix that corresponds to ^ b. The test statistic can then be de¯ned as















The test rejects the null if ^ »3 is too large. Note that the integer m plays the role of a smoothing
parameter in the sense that larger values of m reduce the e®ect of outliers.
The distribution of the test statistic is derived using the bootstrap method suggested by Hall
and Heckman (2000). Note that the most di±cult nondecreasing function for which to test is a
function that is constant in ½i;j. Thus, the distribution of ^ »3 is obtained under the hypothesis that
the function being tested has this feature. In this case we have that
½i = gi ¡
k;wi;wj;di;j¢
+ ²i;
for some constant k. Note that ¸(u) is not included because for a constant ½i;j there is no en-
dogeneity issue. The distribution of the test statistic should then be computed by replacing the
















The distribution of ^ »3 can therefore be derived in three steps. First, for each bootstrap sample
we estimate the residuals ²i and the function gi ¡
k;wi;wj;di;j;yi¢
using the method discussed in
section 5. In the second step, we estimate ^ »3 using the bootstrap sample and (10). In the ¯nal step





´ > q¤ (0:95);
where q¤ (0:95) is obtained using the percentile-t bootstrap method.




is set equal to the order used in the estimation of gi ¡
k;wi;wj;di;j¢
. Other-
wise the choice of the constant for k a®ects the least square estimate of the coe±cient on ½i;j in
S (a;b;h;¸jr;s).
7 Data and Econometric Issues
In the next two subsections we discuss the dataset used in the tests and some econometric issues
related to the their implementation.
7.1 The ICRISAT Dataset
We test homogeneity in risk preferences and e±ciency using the Village Level Studies (VLS) started
by the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT). This dataset
has been chosen for two reasons. First, a good understanding of the e®ect of idiosyncratic shocks
on household welfare is of particular importance in developing countries, where idiosyncratic shocks
may have devastating e®ects on household resources because of the small number of formal markets.
Second, several papers in the past have tested e±cient risk sharing using this dataset. The results
obtained here can therefore be compared with those results.
The ICRISAT started the VLS at six locations in rural India on July 1975. The study added
four villages in 1981. In each village 40 households were selected to represent families with di®erent
social and economic background. The VLS collected data on production, labor supply, assets, price
of goods, monetary, and non-monetary transaction from 1975 to 1985. In addition, the census ¯le
contains information on household size, age, education, land holding class (no land, small farm,
medium farm and large farm), and caste rankings derived using three di®erent methods. The caste
ranking used here is based on Behrman (1988). Townsend (1994) gives a detailed description of
the data. We will, therefore, discuss only the issues that are speci¯c to our paper.
The sample used in the estimation is composed of households from only 3 of the 10 villages that
were included in the study. These three villages are Aurepalle, Shirapur, and Kanzara. We choose
this three villages for two reasons. First, data for these villages are available for the entire sample
period. Second, previous studies have focused on these villages.
Monthly household consumption is calculated using the transaction data from the ICRISAT
Household Transaction Schedule. The consumption variable is the sum of consumption on grain,
20consumption on other food items, namely oil, animal products, fruits and vegetables, and con-
sumption on other non-durable goods. The transaction data are collected during each interview.
The interview frequency varies. According to the ICRISAT manual, each household should be
interviewed at intervals of 3 to 4 weeks. In the data most households are interviewed every month.
But there are consecutive interviews that are two weeks apart and consecutive interviews that are
two months apart. On average each household has more than 11 interviews each year. The main
problem of using the transaction ¯les is that the dates of the interviews di®er across households.
For example, a household in Aurepalle was interviewed on January 11, February 10, and March 21
in 1980, whereas a di®erent household in the same village was interviewed on January 17, February
13, and March 25 in the same year. This makes it di±cult to compare expenditure across di®erent
households. To overcome this problem we assume that the rate of consumption is constant between
two interviews. Under this assumption we can compute monthly consumption using the consump-
tion data from two consecutive interviews. Similarly, the wage and labor supply data are collected
at each interview date and then converted into monthly data.
The construction of the wage and labor supply variables for the tests with nonseparable prefer-
ences requires a separate discussion. Three di®erent types of employment and wages are recorded
by the ICRISAT. The Labor, Draft Animal, and Machinery Utilization Schedule contains informa-
tion on hours, days of employment, and wages of individuals entering daily employment outside
their own farm. In the Household Transaction Schedule labor income of individuals with regular
jobs outside their own farm is recorded, but there is no information on the days and hours of
employment. We assume that the data on regular labor income refer to the period covered by the
interview and that the individual with the regular job works 8 hours a day for 5 days a week. In
the Plot Cultivation Schedule, the ICRISAT collects data on the number of hours supplied by men,
women, and children to their own farm and the value of their labor. The value of own labor is
imputed by the ICRISAT on the basis of the current village-speci¯c market prices. The information
in these three schedules is used to compute monthly household labor supply and wages. Household
labor supply is the average number of hours of employment on daily jobs, regular jobs, and jobs on
own farm supplied by adult members. Household wages are computed as the average of total labor
income earned on any job by adult members divided by the total number of hours. To compute the
total time endowment T and leisure we follow Rosenzweig (1988) and Townsend (1994) and assume
that each individual has 26 days per month and 14 hours per day that can be divided between
21labor and leisure. The remaining days and hours account for sleep, sickness, and holidays.
The Monthly Price Schedule contains detailed information on monthly prices for each consump-
tion item included in the transaction ¯les. The price data are used to construct price indices to
de°ate consumption and wages. To control for household size and age structure, household age-sex
weights are constructed following Townsend (1994). The age-sex weights are constructed by adding
the following numbers: for adult males, 1.0; for adult females, 0.9; for males aged 13-18, 0.94; for
females aged 13-18, 0.83; for children aged 7-12, 0.67; for children aged 4-6, 0.52; for Toddlers
1-3, 0.32; and for infants 0.05. Household consumption is then divided by the weight. The set of
demographic variables includes the mean of the ages of household members, their caste, the number
of infants, and a constant that captures the unobservable heterogeneity.
The sample covers the period from July 1975 to July 1985 for Aurepalle and from July 1975
to July 1984 for Shirapur and Kanzara. We drop the households that leave the sample before
1985 for Aurepalle and 1984 for Shirapur and Kanzara. This implies that for each household in
Aurepalle we have up to 126 observations and for each household in Shirapur and Kanzara up to
114 observation. In all tests, we drop a household if it have fewer than 100 data points.
7.2 Econometric Issues
We estimate the expenditure functions and their di®erences using the series estimator described in
section 5. An important choice is represented by the order of the polynomials. The main variable
in the household expenditure function is total expenditure ½i;j. It is therefore crucial to allow for
a polynomial in this variable that is °exible enough. We have experimented with polynomials of
order between 2 and 5. The outcome of the tests changes substantially when we increase the order
from 2 to 3. But the results are stable for polynomials of order greater than 2. The results reported
in the paper are for a polynomial of order 3.
The demographic and wage variables are not as important for the outcome of the tests. Since
the panel used in the estimation is not long, we have decided to set the order of the polynomial to
1 for all these variables. For the separable case, we have also tested homogeneity in risk preferences
and risk sharing with a polynomial of order 2 in the heterogeneity term with similar results. In the
nonseparable case an increase in the order of the polynomial to 2 reduces signi¯cantly the precision
of the estimates since 32 terms plus the terms of the polynomial in the heterogeneity term u must
be included.
22An increase in the order of the polynomial in u has smaller e®ects on the precision of the
estimates because the interaction between u and the other variables is not required in the estimation.
We experimented with polynomials of order 1, 2, and 3 with similar ¯ndings. The results are
reported for a polynomial of order 1.
The set of instruments used to control for endogeneity is composed of lagged rain and lagged
total expenditure. The distribution of the test statistics are derived using 500 bootstrap samples. In
all the tests the wages and demographic term must be ¯xed at a particular value. In the tests, these
variables are set equal to the household mean. The kernel estimator employed in the e±ciency test
with excluded variables uses a gaussian kernel. In the e±ciency test with increasing expenditure
functions, the smoothing parameter is set equal to m.
8 Results With Separable Preferences
In this section, we test homogeneity in risk preferences and e±cient risk sharing under the assump-
tion that household preferences are separable between consumption and leisure. If this restriction
is satis¯ed, the amount of resources allocated to household i, ½i, corresponds to expenditure on
the consumption good ci and total resources, ½i;j, corresponds to total consumption expenditure
of household i and j. Homogeneity in risk preferences and e±ciency can therefore be tested using
only data on consumption.14
We ¯rst test homogeneity in risk preferences. The estimation of the household expenditure
functions results indicates that every pair of households can be assigned to one of three di®erent
categories: (i) pairs of households whose expenditure functions do not cross; (ii) pairs with ex-
penditure functions that cross once; (iii) pairs whose expenditure functions cross twice. Figure 6
depicts one pair of households for each category for Aurepalle. The ¯nding that the expenditure
functions cross is a ¯rst indication that heterogeneity in risk preferences is a signi¯cant feature of
Indian villages. The outcome of the test of homogeneity in risk preferences discussed in section 6.1
are presented in tables 2-4. Homogeneity in risk preferences is rejected in the three Indian villages.
The village with more rejections is Kanzara with 117 cases out of 528, which corresponds to 22% of
possible cases. The village with fewer rejections is Shirapur with 80 pairs that reject homogeneity
in risk preferences out of 595 possible pairs, which corresponds to 13% of cases. Figure 7 depicts
14The tests can also be implemented using only data on leisure. However, as discussed in Townsend (1994) the
ICRISAT leisure and wage data are noisier than the consumption data.
23the di®erence in household expenditures for one of those pairs. It is therefore not surprising that
previous papers that have used ICRISAT have rejected e±cient risk sharing.
We now focus on the e±ciency tests. We ¯rst test whether non-labor income a®ects household
expenditure after controlling for pooled resources. We then evaluate whether household expenditure
increases with pooled resources.
The outcome of the test of e±ciency with excluded variables is presented in columns eight and
nine of Tables 2-4. In the three villages e±ciency is rejected for a negligible number of households.
The village with the largest percentage of rejections is Aurepalle at 2%, with 22 households out of
1122. The village with the lowest percentage of rejections is Shirapur with 1%.
We now proceed to test e±ciency using the monotonicity of the expenditure functions. The
results of the test are presented in columns six and seven of Table 2-4. The second test of e±ciency
displays a pattern of rejections that is similar to the excluded variable test. In all villages we reject
e±ciency for about 1% of households.
These results suggest that if risk preferences are allowed to vary across households, there is very
little evidence against e±cient risk sharing using the standard testable implication.
9 Results With Non-separable Preferences
In this section the tests are implemented by allowing for non-separability between consumption and
leisure. In this case, household expenditure di®ers from the expenditure obtained with separable
preferences in two respects. First, the second stage of the Pareto problem implies that household
expenditure is also a function of wages, i.e.
½k = gk ¡
½i;j;wi;wj;di;j¢
+ mk; k = i;j: (11)
This implies that e±ciency and heterogeneity in risk preferences can be tested only after the vari-
ation produced by di;j, and w has been removed. To this end we ¯rst estimate semi-parametrically
the expenditure functions and their di®erences. We then ¯x wages and the heterogeneity term at
the household mean and use the changes in ½i;j to perform the tests. A second di®erence is that
household expenditure ½k is equal to expenditure on consumption ck plus expenditure on leisure
wklk.
We ¯rst describe the outcome of the risk preferences test. After controlling for variations in
wages, we still ¯nd households with expenditure functions that cross one and two times. Figure 10
24describes three pairs of households with di®erent crossing patterns. The outcome of the formal test
of homogeneity in risk preferences is described in tables 5-7. In the non-separable case 16% of the
pairs in Aurepalle, 21% of the pairs in Kanzara, and 13% of the pairs in Shirapur are characterized
by expenditure functions that cross.
The results of the e±ciency test with excluded variables are reported in the last two columns
of table 5-7. In this case, the largest fraction of rejections is in Aurepalle and Kanzara with
1%. Columns six and seven of table 5-7 reports the outcome of the e±ciency test with monotone
functions. The ¯ndings are similar to the excluded variable test.
To summarize, non-separability between consumption and leisure does not change the outcome
of the tests. We still ¯nd strong evidence against homogeneous risk preferences and little evidence
against e±cient risk sharing in Indian villages once we allow for di®erent risk preferences across
households.
10 Household Composition and Heterogeneity in Risk Preferences
In this paper we follow the risk sharing literature and we do not allow households to change
their composition in response to idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. The changes in household
composition are assumed to be exogenous and they are captures by changes in the age-gender
weight discussed in the data section and by changes in observable heterogeneity. If the changes
in household composition are in response to shocks, the test of homogeneous risk preferences may
capture a di®erent evolution of household composition across households that is not captured by
the age-gender weight or observable heterogeneity instead of heterogeneity in risk preferences.
In this section we attempt to determine the e®ect of changes in household composition on the
risk preferences test. To that end we test homogeneity in risk preferences by excluding from the
sample households that experience a change in the number of members that is not a birth or a
death. Table 8 describes the households that are characterized by this type of change. In the
data, 9 out of 34 households are characterized by at least one change during the sample period.
In 5 of these households one or two adult members left the family during the sample period. In
3 households, one child entered the family and in one household a child left the family during the
years 1975-1985.15 The outcome of the risk preferences test for the separable and non-separable
15If we include changes in household composition due to death, the number of households with variation in the
number of members increases to 12. Almost all household have at least one birth.
25case for the households with no change in composition is similar to the one obtained using the
entire sample.
11 Conclusions
Previous papers have tested e±cient risk sharing under the assumption that households have iden-
tical risk preferences. In this paper we reject this assumption. This implies that previous papers
should always have rejected e±cient risk sharing even if households are fully insuring each other.
We then derive two tests of e±ciency that allow for heterogeneity in risk preferences. The outcome
of the tests indicate that households in Indian villages fully share risk.
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28A Lemma 1
The following Lemma is required in the proof of Propositions 1 and 2.
Lemma 1 Suppose that the utility functions of household i and j are strictly increasing and con-





strictly increasing functions of pooled income.
Proof. The lemma will be proved by contradiction. Consider two realizations of aggregate







Strict concavity of the household utility function implies that the corresponding value function is






















where the ¯rst and third equalities follow from e±ciency and the inequality follows from the strict
concavity of V h ¡
½i;j¢

















· ¹ ½i;j < ½i;j;
which cannot be the e±cient allocation of resources since preferences are strictly increasing.
B Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The proposition will be proved by contradiction. Suppose household i and j share risk











16For a proof see for instance Proposition 3.6 in Kreps (1990).




































which implies that household i's expenditure function is decreasing. This contradicts Lemma 1 and
e±ciency.
C Proof of Proposition 2
Proof.
(Necessary condition) Lemma 1 is the ¯rst part of Proposition 2.
(Su±cient condition) Suppose that preferences are separable between consumption and leisure
or that wi and wj are constant across states and over time. Then,
½i = ½i ¡
½i;j;wi;wj¢
= ^ ½i ¡
½i;j¢
; (12)
½j = ½j ¡
½i;j;wj;wi¢
= ^ ½j ¡
½i;j¢
; (13)
for some functions ^ ½i and ^ ½i.
Under the assumption that ½i and ½j are strictly increasing functions of ½i;j, equations (12) and











^ ½i¢¡1 is the inverse function of ^ ½i. Let g : R+ ! R+ be a strictly decreasing function and
¹k a scalar satisfying 0 < ¹k < 1, for k = 1;:::n, and
Pn












30Let the function V k ¡
½k¢
















which implies that V k
½ > 0 and V k
½½ < 0. Consequently, V k ¡
½k¢
is a well-de¯ned strictly increasing
and concave utility function over ½k.
Under separable preferences ½k is equal to consumption of household k. Under the assumption
that real wages are constant, the composite commodity theorem shows that consumption and
leisure can be treated as a single good and that only the utility function over the composite good
½k = ck + wklk is relevant to describe household behavior.17 Hence, by (15) there exists strictly











17See Hick (1936) for a proof of the composite commodity theorem.
31E Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Aurepalle Kanzara Shirapur
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Grain 14.7 14.5 25.8 20.2 27.6 28.9
Food (minus Grain) 10.6 10.4 18.4 19.3 13.7 11.3
Non-Durable (minus Grain, Food) 7.5 14.9 3.3 4.9 4.3 9.8
Household size 7.8 3.2 7.5 3.6 7.4 3.6
Number of Infants 0.14 0.35 0.09 0.30 0.14 0.36
Mean Adult age 38.5 6.6 38.9 6.7 37.6 7.5
Age-Gender Weight 6.4 2.9 6.2 2.8 6.0 2.9
Caste Rank 50.9 28.3 47.6 26.9 54.3 26.5
Daily Wage 3.4 4.4 5.1 7.2 4.0 5.5
Daily Labor Supply 5.1 3.6 5.9 3.3 5.7 2.4
Non-labor Income 0.23 56.5 2.70 48.7 3.3 55.0
N. of Households 34 33 35
N. of Households with Wage 30 26 25
32Table 2: Aurepalle. Tests With Observable and Unobservable Heterogeneity. Separable Case.
Number Total N. Total N. Reject. of Identical Reject. of Increasing Reject. of E±ciency
of HH of Pairs of Cases Risk Preferences Expend. Functions Non-labor Income
All Households 34 561 1122 87/561 16% 8/1122 1% 22/1122 2%
By landholding category
Landless Laborers 7 21 42 5/21 24% 0/42 0% 0/42 0%
Small Farmers 9 36 72 4/36 11% 0/72 0% 1/72 1%
Medium Farmers 8 28 56 2/28 7% 1/56 2% 1/56 2%
Large Farmers 10 45 90 8/45 18% 0/90 0% 0/90 0%
By caste
Caste Score=7.5 5 10 20 2/10 20% 0/20 0% 0/20 0%
Caste Score=18.75 2 1 2 1/1 100% 0/2 0% 0/2 0%
Caste Score=30 5 10 20 2/10 20% 0/20 0% 0/20 0%
Caste Score=55 9 36 72 1/36 3% 0/72 0% 1/72 1%
Caste Score=86.25 6 15 30 2/15 13% 0/30 0% 0/30 0%
Caste Score=97.5 2 1 2 0/1 0% 0/2 0% 0/2 0%
33Table 3: Kanzara. Tests With Observable and Unobservable Heterogeneity. Separable Case.
Number Total N. Total N. Reject. of Identical Reject. of Increasing Reject. of E±ciency
of HH of Pairs of Cases Risk Preferences Expend. Functions Non-labor Income
All Households 33 528 1056 117/528 22% 6/1056 1% 16/1056 1.5%
By landholding category
Landless Laborers 9 36 72 6/36 17% 0/72 0% 0/72 0%
Small Farmers 8 28 56 3/28 11% 1/56 2% 1/56 2%
Medium Farmers 8 28 56 4/28 14% 0/56 0% 0/56 0%
Large Farmers 8 28 56 6/28 21% 0/56 0% 0/56 0%
By caste
Caste Score=5 4 6 12 0/6 0% 0/12 0% 0/12 0%
Caste Score=23.75 8 28 56 7/28 25% 1/56 2% 1/56 2%
Caste Score=72.5 17 136 272 26/136 19% 0/272 0% 0/272 0%
34Table 4: Shirapur. Tests With Observable and Unobservable Heterogeneity. Separable Case.
Number Total N. Total N. Reject. of Identical Reject. of Increasing Reject. of E±ciency
of HH of Pairs of Cases Risk Preferences Expend. Functions Non-labor Income
All Households 35 595 1190 80/595 13% 12/1190 1% 10/1190 1%
By landholding category
Landless Laborers 6 15 30 0/15 0% 0/30 0% 0/30 0%
Small Farmers 10 45 90 2/45 4% 1/90 1% 1/90 1%
Medium Farmers 10 45 90 3/45 7% 0/90 0% 0/90 0%
Large Farmers 9 36 72 5/36 14% 0/72 0% 0/72 0%
By caste
Caste Score=11.25 5 10 20 0/10 0% 0/20 0% 0/20 0%
Caste Score=27.5 2 1 2 0/1 0% 0/2 0% 0/2 0%
Caste Score=55 13 78 156 10/78 13% 2/156 1% 1/156 1%
Caste Score=76.25 3 3 6 0/3 0% 0/6 0% 0/6 0%
Caste Score=91.25 7 21 42 4/21 19% 0/42 0% 0/42 0%
35Table 5: Aurepalle. Tests With Observable and Unobservable Heterogeneity. Non-separable Case.
Number Total N. Total N. Reject. of Identical Reject. of Increasing Reject. of E±ciency
of HH of Pairs of Cases Risk Preferences Expend. Functions Non-labor Income
All Households 30 435 870 69/435 16% 7/870 1% 12/870 1.5%
By landholding category
Landless Laborers 6 15 30 2/15 14% 1/30 3% 1/30 3%
Small Farmers 9 36 72 4/36 10% 0/72 0% 1/72 1%
Medium Farmers 6 15 30 0/15 0% 0/30 0% 0/30 0%
Large Farmers 9 36 72 8/36 22% 1/72 1% 1/72 1%
By caste
Caste Score=7.5 5 10 20 2/10 20% 0/20 0% 0/20 0%
Caste Score=18.75 2 1 2 0/1 0% 0/2 0% 0/2 0%
Caste Score=30 5 10 20 0/10 0% 0/20 0% 0/20 0%
Caste Score=55 8 28 56 5/28 18% 0/56 0% 1/56 1%
Caste Score=86.25 5 10 20 1/10 10% 0/20 0% 0/20 0%
Caste Score=97.5 2 1 2 0/1 0% 0/2 0% 0/2 0%
36Table 6: Kanzara. Tests With Observable and Unobservable Heterogeneity. Non-separable Case.
Number Total N. Total N. Reject. of Identical Reject. of Increasing Reject. of E±ciency
of HH of Pairs of Cases Risk Preferences Expend. Functions Non-labor Income
All Households 26 325 650 68/325 21% 5/650 1% 7/650 1%
By landholding category
Landless Laborers 6 15 30 4/15 27% 1/30 3% 1/30 3%
Small Farmers 7 21 42 6/21 29% 2/42 5% 1/42 2%
Medium Farmers 7 21 42 3/21 14% 0/42 0% 0/42 0%
Large Farmers 6 15 30 2/15 13% 0/30 0% 0/30 0%
By caste
Caste Score=5 3 3 6 1/3 30% 0/6 0% 0/6 0%
Caste Score=23.75 7 21 42 6/21 29% 0/42 0% 0/42 0%
Caste Score=72.5 12 66 132 12/66 18% 0/132 0% 0/132 0%
37Table 7: Shirapur. Tests With Observable and Unobservable Heterogeneity. Non-separable Case.
Number Total N. Total N. Reject. of Identical Reject. of Increasing Reject. of E±ciency
of HH of Pairs of Cases Risk Preferences Expend. Functions Non-labor Income
All Households 25 300 600 38/300 13% 1/600 0.0% 2/600 0%
By landholding category
Landless Laborers 5 10 20 3/10 30% 0/20 0% 0/20 0%
Small Farmers 9 36 72 6/36 17% 0/72 0% 0/72 0%
Medium Farmers 8 28 56 6/28 21% 0/56 0% 0/56 0%
Large Farmers 3 3 6 0/3 0% 0/6 0% 0/6 0%
By caste
Caste Score=11.25 5 10 20 2/10 20% 0/20 0% 0/20 0%
Caste Score=55 13 78 156 11/78 14% 0/156 0% 0/156 0%
Caste Score=76.25 2 1 2 0/1 0% 0/2 0% 0/2 0%
38Table 8: Changes in Household Composition Excluding Births and Deaths. Aurepalle.
Variable N. Households N. Adult Males N. Adult Females
Households with a Change in Household Composition 9 - -
Households with a Change in Number of Adults 5 3 3
Households in which an Adult Left 5 3 3
Households with a Change in Number of Children 4 - -
Households in which Child Left 1 - -
Households in which Child Entered 3 - -
Table 9: Transfers Across Households.
Aurepalle Kanzara Shirapur
Variable Mean % of Expen. Mean % of Expen. Mean % of Expen.
Non-durable Expenditure 214.7 ¡ 280.5 ¡ 279.4 ¡
Transfers Given
Total Transfers 69.6 32% 41.6 15% 20.7 7%
Total Transfers as Gift At Marriage 23.4 11% 8.0 3% 5.9 2%
Total Transfers within Village 28.0 13% 14.8 5% 11.2 4%
Tr. to Relatives/Caste Fellows 60.9 28% 36.7 13% 18.3 7:5%
Tr. to Relat./Caste Fellows w. Village 27.1 13% 11.7 4% 10.0 4%
Transfers to Others 8.7 4% 4.9 2% 2.4 1%
Transfers to Others within Village 0.9 0:4% 3.1 1% 1.2 0:4%
Transfers Received
Total Transfers 35.9 17% 42.2 15% 36.2 13%
Total Transfers as Gift At Marriage 5.9 21% 8.1 12% 16.8 5%
Total Transfers within Village 9.1 4% 11.8 4% 29.3 11%
Tr. to Relatives/Caste Fellows 28.1 13% 33.9 12% 25.3 9%
Tr. to Relat./Caste Fellows w. Village 4.7 2% 6.4 2% 24.4 9%
Transfers to Others 7.9 4% 8.3 3% 10.9 4%
Transfers to Others within Village 4.4 2% 5.4 2% 4.9 2%
Exchanged Laborers and Bullocks
Exchanged Laborers 0.3 0:0% 1.2 0:4% 0.3 0:0%
Exchanged Bullocks 2.7 1% 7.3 3% 2.3 1%
39F Figures
Figure 1: E±ciency Condition with Heterogeneous HARA Preferences and ¹1 = ¹2
MU of HH 1:a=–2,r=2.5
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Figure 2: E±cient Consumption with Heterogeneous HARA Preferences and ¹1 = ¹2
Consumption of HH 1 - a=–2,r=2.50








4 6 8 10 12 14
Aggregate Income












0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Consumption

































Marginal Utility of Household 1: a=-2, r=1.25
Marginal Utility of Household 2: a=-2, r=1.25


















































Consumption of Household 1: a=-2, r=1.25
Consumption of Household 2: a=-2, r=1.25
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